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INTRODUCTION 
 
The way the Arctic is perceived, in terms of policy and law, 
has changed considerably in recent years. For someone like 
myself, who has been following the development of the region 
for a couple of decades, it is of interest why this has taken place
1
 
– and what has been driving these changes.  
Understanding how these sudden changes in Arctic policy 
and law have been interpreted in the larger community of 
researchers and professionals–that have worked on a broad field 
of Arctic governance–is also interesting. It is my argument that 
                                                 
* This article is based on a keynote presentation at the Michigan State 
University College of Law Symposium “Battle of the North: Is All Quite on the 
Arctic Front,” 21-22 February 2013, hosted by the Michigan State International 
Law Review. 
1 I defended my dissertation: “Environmental Impact Assessment in the 
Arctic: A Study of International Legal Norms” in 2001, see TIMO KOIVUROVA, 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN THE ARCTIC: A STUDY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL NORMS (2002), and have since been leading large 
international research projects, and have given policy advice in issues of Arctic 
international governance. I have published extensively on these issues for over 
15 years and participated in numerous seminars, conferences and workshops. 
Particularly interesting in this respect was my experience as a member of the 
program board overseeing a large international research program Geopolitics 
North (http://www.geopoliticsnorth.org/), which ran from 2008-2012. The 
project started with classical geopolitical assumptions but had to revise these as 
they carried the research work. The project progressed very much in line with 
the dialectical understanding that I will present later in the article. 
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there exists a loose network of experts in Arctic international 
governance, of which only a minority are lawyers or legal 
scholars. This loose network of experts – to some aspects similar 
to what we in international law have called “invisible college of 
international lawyers”2 or Peter Haas as an epistemic 
community
3
 – can be argued to be found also among those who 
specialize in Arctic international governance. In 1977, while 
discussing the invisible college of international lawyers, Oscar 
Schachter advances the view: 
 
That professional community, though dispersed 
throughout the world and engaged in diverse 
occupations[,] constitutes a kind of invisible college 
dedicated to a common intellectual enterprise . . . . 
[I]ts members are engaged in a continuous process of 
communication and collaboration. Evidence of this 
process is found in the journals and yearbooks of 
international law, in the transnational movement of 
professors and students, and in the numerous 
conferences, seminars and colloquia held in all parts 
of the globe.
4
 [O]ne last point merits attention in 
regard to the law making role of the professional 
community of international lawyers. That may be 
summarized as a traditional concern with the 
requirements of “la conscience juridique,” sometimes 
translated as the sense of justice.
5
 
 
In a similar vein, the “Arctic knowledge community” 
participates in the same seminars and conferences and publishes, 
generally, in the same periodicals. The “Arctic knowledge 
community” possesses the characteristics defined by Haas as a 
“recognized expertise and competence [in Arctic governance 
issues as well as] an authoritative claim to policy-relevant 
                                                 
2 See generally Oscar Schachter, The Invisible College of International 
Lawyers, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 217 (1977). 
3 See generally Peter Haas, Epistemic Communities and International 
Policy Coordination, INT’L ORG., Winter 1992, at 1. 
4 Schachter, supra note 2, at 217. 
5 Id. at 225. 
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knowledge within [an] issue-area.”6 In addition, both Schachter 
and Haas define their respective invisible college or an epistemic 
community as consisting of persons who are not only interested 
in gaining knowledge, but care also of how policy evolves in that 
specific issue area.
7
 Arctic knowledge community does not only 
restrain itself to analyzing what has taken place in Arctic 
governance; its members also actively assert their claims 
regarding how this governance can be improved.  
My argument is that, within this Arctic governance 
knowledge community, the interpretation of what is problematic 
in Arctic governance, particularly in offshore oil and gas, has 
progressed through dialectical stages of “scramble for 
resources”8 to “orderly development”9 and finally to what I refer 
to as “somewhat orderly exploitation.” This dialectic has been 
evident in how we have interpreted what is problematic 
regarding the way the states have occupied or exercised their 
powers/rights in the Arctic Ocean sea floor.   
First, it is important to take the “scramble for resources” 
storyline seriously because it is not only various media that 
                                                 
6 Haas, supra note 3, at 3. 
7 In his The Invisible College of International Lawyers, Schachter speaks 
of the “professional community” of international lawyers forming an “invisible 
college dedicated to a common intellectual enterprise.” Schachter, supra note 2, 
at 217. Regarding “epistemic communities” Haas observes: “ usable knowledge 
encompasses a substantive core that makes it usable for policy makers, and a 
procedural dimension that provides a mechanism for transmitting knowledge 
from the scientific community to the policy world. . . .” Peter Haas, When Does 
Power Listen to Truth? A Constructivist Approach to the Policy Process, J. 
EUR. PUB. POL’Y, Aug. 2004, at 569, 573. 
8 See, e.g., Brian Beary, Race for the Arctic, 2 CQ GLOBAL 
RESEARCH  213, 217 (2008); Scott G. Borgerson, Arctic Meltdown: The 
Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming, 86 FOREIGN AFF. 63 
(2008); KENNETH J .BIRD ET AL., CIRCUM-ARCTIC RESOURCE APPRAISAL: 
ESTIMATES OF UNDISCOVERED OIL AND GAS NORTH OF THE ARCTIC CIRCLE, 
UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY (Peter H. Stauffer ed., 2008), available at 
http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/fs2008-3049.pdf (last visited Sept. 11, 2012) 
[hereinafter USGS Appraisal]. 
9 See, e.g., Timo Koivurova, Power Politics or Orderly Development? 
Why Are States “Claiming” Large Areas of the Arctic Seabed? in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENT 362 
(Sanford R. Silverburg ed., 2011). 
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perceive that such development is going on in the Arctic, but 
many academic and policy researchers take this tack as well.
10
 
We need to take it seriously because it misinforms public 
understanding of the Arctic, and has implications for how 
researchers make policy recommendations. Moreover, this 
storyline continues to exert influence, even if most experts have 
abandoned it as the best explanation of what is unfolding in the 
Arctic; the media keeps utilizing this storyline still today.
11
 It is, 
therefore, important to first make an attempt to explain why this 
storyline has become so popular in explaining the continental 
shelf claims in the Arctic. 
 
I. SCRAMBLE FOR RESOURCES 
 
It was with disbelief that many reacted to what Russian 
submarines did in August 2007, planting their flag underneath 
the North Pole in Lomonosov Ridge.
12
 The Canadian Minister 
for Foreign Affairs stated to the media that “[t]his isn't the 15th 
century. You can't go around the world and just plant flags to 
claim territory.”13 Other Arctic Ocean coastal states also reacted 
to the Russian move. The United States officially criticized many 
aspects of the Russian claim, especially Russia’s attempt to 
                                                 
10 Borgerson, supra note 8, at 63; see also Timo Koivurova, Do the 
Continental Shelf Developments Challenge the Polar Regimes?, in 1 THE 
YEARBOOK OF POLAR LAW 477 (2009) [hereinafter Continental Shelf]. 
11 See Timo Koivurova, Is There a Race to Resources in the Polar 
Regions? in CANADA’S AND EUROPE’S NORTHERN DIMENSIONS 52 (2009) 
available at http://www.cci.ualberta.ca/en/OutreachandEvents/Canadasand 
EuropesNorthernDimen/~/media/cci/Documents/PagesfromCanadasandEurope
sNorthernDimensionsIsthere.pdf (last visited June 11, 2013). 
12 A collateral symbol to commence a new era within Arctic affairs was 
the expedition ‘Arktika 2007’, in which a submarine planted the Russian 
national flag on the seabed at the North Pole instantly drew further attention 
from around the world to a rising geopolitical debate concerning the Arctic. See 
Piotr Graczyk and Timo Koivurova, A New Era in the Arctic Council’s 
External Relations? Broader Consequences of the Nuuk Observer Rules for 
Arctic governance, POLAR RECORD, Jan. 23, 2013, at 1, 5 (2013). 
13 Doug Struck, Russia’s Deep-Sea Flag-Planting at North Pole Strikes a 
Chill in Canada, WASH. POST (Aug. 7, 2007), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/08/06/AR2007080601369.html. 
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assert sovereign rights over the Lomonosov Ridge that runs 
through the Central Arctic Ocean Basin. According to the US, 
the Lomonosov Ridge “is oceanic part of the Arctic Ocean basin 
and not a natural component of the continental margins of either 
Russia or of any State.”14 
The Russian flag planting – and the almost simultaneous 
reports of the dramatic loss of sea ice in the Arctic Ocean in 
September 2007
15
 – reinforced the view that the scramble for 
resources had started. With the scramble for resources underway 
and the decreasing levels of sea ice, a new ocean containing vast 
quantities of hydrocarbons,
16
 is opening up. It is these new 
reserves of hydrocarbons over which the states are fighting.  
There seemed to be no doubt that climate change was 
melting the Arctic Ocean sea ice, since 1979 satellite information 
demonstrated this to be the case.
17
 In general, since ice and snow 
are the first to react to global warming, it has been estimated that 
the Arctic has already been impacted by climate change, and the 
change there will be twice as intense as the change in other 
regions of the world.
18
 Indeed, it seems to be one of the 
                                                 
14 Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, United States of 
America: Notification Regarding the Submission Made by the Russian 
Federation of the Commission of the Limits of the Continental Shelf, 
CLCS.01.2001.LOS/US (March 18, 2002), available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/CLCS_01_200
1_LOS__USAtext.pdf. 
15 See generally Arctic Sea Ice, NASA EARTH OBSERVATORY, 
http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Features/SeaIce/page3.php (last visited June 9, 
2013). 
16 These resources account for about 22 percent of the undiscovered, 
technically recoverable resources in the world. See USGS Appraisal, supra note 
8. 
17 “Since 1979, by using passive microwave satellite data, [it has been] 
seen that Arctic perennial sea ice cover has been declining at 9.6 percent per 
decade.” Arctic Sea Ice Continues to Decline, Arctic Temperatures Continue to 
Rise in 2005, NASA (Sept. 28, 2005), 
http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/English.pdf. 
18 See generally ARCTIC MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAM, 
IMPACTS OF A WARMING ARCTIC (2004) available at 
http://www.amap.no/documents/doc/impacts-of-a-warming-arctic-2004/786. 
(last visited Sept. 2, 2012) [hereinafter IMPACTS]. See INTERNATIONAL ENERGY 
AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012 (2012) available at 
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consequences of climate change that previously inaccessible 
regions will be opened up to resource development; and it could 
be argued that there certainly are several compelling reasons for 
why the world should make use of the vast reserves of 
hydrocarbons from the seabed of the Arctic waters. 
First of all, despite growing international demands for the 
development of renewable energy sources, fossil fuels seem to 
have a future in the energy markets after all. The International 
Energy Agency (IEA) has recently estimated that, despite the 
efforts by the climate regime to convert our energy use towards 
renewables, with the present energy development scenarios, our 
dependence on fossil fuels will grow even more by 2030.
19
 And 
the Arctic hydrocarbon resources seem tempting from two 
perspectives. They are estimated to be plentiful and they are 
generally considered to be safe, as they are located in areas with 
no on-going political conflicts.
20
 It can, thus, be concluded that 
the combined effect of climate change and interests to exploit 
hydrocarbons in the Arctic could likely explain why the Russians 
started to “occupy” the sea floor in 2007.  
And it was evident to the media that the Arctic Ocean coastal 
states were out there to occupy as much of the seafloor as 
possible. For example in 2001 the Russians staked its claim to 
much of the Central Arctic Ocean seafloor, and sent a research 
vessel to study the sea floor.
21
 Since then other countries have 
followed Russia’s lead. Norwegians made their official claim in 
                                                                                                 
http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weowebsite/2012/Acknowledgeme
nts.pdf. 
19 See, e.g., World Energy Needs and Nuclear Power, WORLD NUCLEAR 
ASS’N, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Current-and-Future-
Generation/World-Energy-Needs-and-Nuclear-Power/#.UbWmxNhqPHQ (last 
updated July 28, 2013).  
20 See USGS Appraisal, supra note 8, at 3; see generally INTERNATIONAL 
ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 18 (describing Iraq as a current source of 
hydrocarbons). On the other hand, it would seem that Arctic gas is not as 
tempting to exploit as it used to be given the shale gas boom in the US.  
21 Clifford Krauss Et Al., As Polar Ice Turns to Water, Dreams of 
Treasure Abound, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2005, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/10/science/10arctic.html?pagewanted=print
&_r=0. 
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2006,
22
 and Canada, Denmark (Greenland), and the United States 
announced that they are trying to make their claims.
23
 This 
seemed to carry with it the possibility that the states’ interests 
would run counter to each other and tensions, even military 
conflicts, could ensue.
24
  
This drama provoked swift political and legal action in 2007, 
first from the “foreign minister” of the European Union (EU), 
who argued–in releasing the Commission’s report on climate 
change and international security–that some type of international 
treaty was needed to contain the geopolitical struggle unfolding 
in the region.
25
 As much was suggested by Scott G. Borgerson – 
International Affairs Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations 
and a former Lieutenant Commander in the US Coast Guard – in 
a 2007 edition of Foreign Affairs, arguing that even military 
conflict of some sort may be possible:  
 
The situation is especially dangerous because there 
are currently no overarching political or legal 
structures that can provide for the orderly 
development of the region or mediate political 
disagreements over Arctic resources or sea-lanes. The 
Arctic has always been frozen; as ice turns to water, 
it is not clear which rules should apply. The rapid 
melt is also rekindling numerous interstate rivalries 
and attracting energy-hungry newcomers, such as 
China, to the region. The Arctic powers are fast 
approaching diplomatic gridlock, and that could 
eventually lead to the sort of armed brinkmanship 
                                                 
22 Press Release, Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, 
Receipt of the Submission Made by Norway to the Commission on the Limits 
of the Continental Shelf, U.N. Doc. 06/313 (Dec. 21, 2006), available at 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nor06/clcs_07_2006_l
os_e.pdf [hereinafter Norway Submission]. 
23 See generally Vladimir Jares, The Continental Shelf Beyond 200 
Nautical Miles: The Work of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf and the Arctic, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1265, 1302-03 (2009).  
24 See Borgerson, supra note 8, at 71, 74, 75-76. 
25 Resolution of 9 October 2008 on Arctic Governance, PARL. EUR. DOC. 
(P6_TA(2008)0474) (2008), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P6-TA-
2008-0474&language=EN. 
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that plagues other territories, such as the desolate but 
resource-rich Spratly Islands, where multiple states 
claim sovereignty but no clear picture of ownership 
exists.
26
   
 
Overall, it seemed at the time that it was beyond any serious 
discussion and that what is called here “scramble for resources” 
explains the behaviour of states.
27
 In this storyline, 
unprecedented and rapid climate change opens the Arctic as 
terrain for power politics over who is able to stake the 
hydrocarbon resources of the Arctic Ocean seabed first. Yet, 
despite the fact that it did convince most in the Arctic 
governance knowledge community at the time, it was clearly an 
erroneous account of events and was fairly soon abandoned by 
the knowledge community as not explaining what is taking place 
in the region. A better explanation seemed to be what I call here 
“orderly development.” 
 
II. ORDERLY DEVELOPMENT 
 
Soon, international law scholars, among others, suggested 
that the Arctic Ocean coastal states are, in fact, following rules 
of an international treaty, the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (hereinafter UNCLOS).
28
 As a collective, we 
legal professionals were able to tell to the rest of the world – as 
we did in the first polar law symposium held in 2008 in Akureyri 
Iceland – that states are just following the rules and procedures 
of the law of the sea and UNCLOS.
29
 When we drafted our 
media release, colleagues from other disciplines of the Arctic 
governance knowledge community were curious as to how 
something like international law can explain what is happening. 
Many in the geography or international relations fields were 
unaware of UNCLOS (or customary law of the sea as mostly 
codified by UNCLOS), so there was lots of discussion involving 
                                                 
26 Borgerson, supra note 8, at 71. 
27 See Continental Shelf, supra note 10. 
28 See Koivurova, supra note 9. 
29 Continental Shelf, supra note 10, at 1 484-87. 
2013] The Dialectic of Understanding Arctic Governance 9 
 
how rules had come into being and by which procedures the 
states are legally bound. In a nutshell, continental shelf rules 
evolved in a particular manner, which is explained below.  
Before World War II, coastal states enjoyed sovereignty only 
over a narrow strip of territorial seas, extending three to four 
nautical miles.
30
 This was changed dramatically after the war, 
with the 1945 Truman Proclamation by the US, declaring the 
following:  
 
Having concern for the urgency of conserving and 
prudently utilizing its natural resources, the 
Government of the United States regards the natural 
resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental 
shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to the 
coasts of the United States as appertaining to the 
United States, subject to its jurisdiction and control.
31
  
 
This initiated the era of creeping coastal state jurisdiction, 
especially in regard to the sea bed, the outer limit of which was 
defined in Article 1 of the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention as 
follows: 
 
For the purpose of these articles, the term 
"continental shelf" is used as referring (a) to the 
seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to 
the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to 
a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where 
the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the 
exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas; 
                                                 
30 Id. 
31 John T. Woolley & Gerhard Peters, Harry S. Truman: ‘Proclamation 
2667 - Policy of the United States With Respect to the Natural Resources of the 
Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf,’ September 28, 1945, THE 
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=12332 (last visited Sept. 
13, 2013). 
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(b) to the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine 
areas adjacent to the coasts of islands.
32
 
 
The problem with this definition was that it effectively 
permitted the possibility of coastal states claiming larger seabed 
resources with the development of technology, to the extent that 
even ocean floors could have been divided between the coastal 
states.
33
 A counterforce for this trajectory came from Maltese 
ambassador Arvid Pardo, who, in 1967, proposed in the UN 
General Assembly that the ocean floor be designated as a 
common heritage of humankind.
34
 Pardo argued that it should be 
administered and overseen by an international governance 
mechanism, whereby the economic benefits of the ocean floor 
riches could be shared equitably between developing and 
developed states.
35
 Pardo’s proposal also served as one major 
reason for why the third United Nations Conference on the Law 
of the Sea was convened in New York in 1973 (the first 
UNCLOS and second UNCLOS were held in Geneva in 1958 
and 1960 respectively), now with the aim to produce a 
comprehensive “constitution” of the oceans, which became the 
UNCLOS.
36
  
The Convention was negotiated over an extended period of 
time – from 1973 to 198237 – as a package deal, permitting no 
                                                 
32 Convention on the Continental Shelf, art. 1, Apr. 29, 1958, 499 
U.N.T.S. 312, 312, available at 
http://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/UNTS/Volume%20499/v499.pdf. 
33   Id. at 485. 
34 U.N. GAOR, 22d Sess., 1516th mtg. at 1, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. 
A/C.1/PV.1515 (Nov. 1, 1967). 
35   See id. ¶ 6.  
36  See R.V. CHURCHILL & A.V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 13-15 (2d 
ed. 1988). Four conventions were adopted during UNCLOS I in 1958. Id. at 13. 
37 See U.N. Div. for Ocean Affairs & the Law of the Sea, The United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (A Historical Perspective) (1998), 
available at 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_historical_per
spective.htm#Historical Perspective. 
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reservations to the Convention.
38
 UNCLOS was able to achieve a 
compromise between various groupings of states having 
differing kinds of interests related to the seabed.
39
 For instance, 
broad continental margin states were able to have rules accepted, 
which allowed the whole continental margin to be subjected to 
the sovereign rights of coastal states, whereas geologically 
disadvantaged states – those whose continental margin was 
minimal – managed to push for a rule that entitles all states to a 
minimum of 200 nautical miles along the continental shelf, 
meaning that these states effectively exercise powers over the 
ocean floor as well.
40
 UNCLOS was also successful in defining 
more clearly the outer limit of the continental shelf than its 1958 
predecessor convention, and in designating the ocean floor as 
part of the common heritage of mankind and under the 
governance of International Sea-Bed Authority (ISBA).
41
 
Even though, during the negotiations, broad continental 
margin states were able to extend the outer limit of the 
continental shelf to cover the whole geophysical continental 
margin (and in some exceptional cases beyond), they had to 
make compromises as well.
42
 For example, they had to submit to 
rules requiring them to transfer some of the revenues from 
offshore hydrocarbon exploitation in their extended continental 
shelf to developing states via the ISBA
43
 and, more importantly, 
they had to document and “prove” the extent of their continental 
shelf scientifically in the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf (CLCS or Commission), a scientific body with 
21 members.
44
 The submission must be made by a coastal state if 
it perceives that its continental margin exceeds 200 nautical 
miles within ten years from the date when it became a party to 
                                                 
38 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, pt. XVII, art. 309, 
Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, 519 [hereinafter UNCLOS], available at 
http://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/UNTS/Volume%201833/v1833.pdf.  
39 See id.  
40 See id. 
41 See id. pt. XI; see also About Us, INTERNATIONAL SEA BED AUTHORITY, 
http://www.isa.org.jm/en/about (last visited Sept. 13, 2013). 
42 Continental Shelf, supra note 10.  See infra notes 29-30. 
43 UNCLOS, supra note 38, pt. VI art. 82, at 431. 
44 Id. pt. VI art. 76, at 429. see also id. annex II art. 1-2, at 525. 
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the UNCLOS.
45
 The Commission can only make 
recommendations, but these recommendations are legally 
influential because the continental shelf’s outer limits become 
final and binding only when they have been enacted on the basis 
of the recommendations.
46
 The deadline for such submissions is 
fairly tight, given that states need to provide the Commission 
with vast amounts of scientific and technical data. Why? It was 
seen as necessary to define the outer limits of continental shelves 
as quickly as possible, since only after knowing these limits is it 
possible to know where the boundary between states’ continental 
shelves and the Area, which is under the jurisdiction of the 
ISBA, lies.
47
     
Could we international lawyers then support our argument 
that states were only following their UNCLOS duties with 
reliable evidence? Russia was the first country to make the 
submission to the CLCS in 2001, and it was also the first country 
to which the Commission issued recommendations, requiring it 
to revise its submission in the Central Arctic Ocean Basin.
48
 
Whatever symbolic importance the Russian flag planting may 
                                                 
45 Id. annex II art. 4, at 526. This date was postponed by the parties to 
UNCLOS to those states that had become parties before May 1999, thus 
extending their submission deadline to May 2009. UNCLOS, supra note 38, 
annex II art. 4 at 526. 
46 Id. pt. VI art. 76(8), at 429; see also Int’l Law Ass’n [ILA] 71st 
Conference, Berlin, Ger., Aug. 16-21, 2004, Rep. of the Comm. on Legal Issues 
of the Outer Continental Shelf, (2004) available at  
http://www.ilahq.org/download.cfm/docid/B5A51216-8125-4A4B-
ABA5D2CAD1CF4E98. 
47 About Us, supra note 41. 
48 The Secretary-General, Oceans and the law of the sea: Addendum to 
Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶¶ 27, 38-50, U.N. Doc. A/57/57/Add.1 (Oct. 8, 
2002), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/ 
UNDOC/GEN/N02/629/28/PDF/N0262928.pdf?OpenElement. “As regards the 
Central Arctic Ocean, the Commission recommended that the Russian 
Federation make a revised submission in respect of its extended continental 
shelf in that area based on the findings contained in the recommendations.” Id. 
at ¶ 41; see also Mel Weber, Defining the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf 
across the Arctic Basin: The Russian Submission, States’ Rights, Boundary 
Delimitation and Arctic Regional Cooperation, 24 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL 
L., 653, 653-81 (2009) (Providing overview of Russian submission to the 
Commission on the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf). 
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have had for its domestic policy, Russia has not argued that this 
would have any legal effect.
49
 The Russians have insisted that 
they will make the revised submission to the Commission within 
the foreseeable future.
50
 Norway made a submission in 2006 to 
three separate areas in its North East Atlantic and Arctic 
continental shelves.
51
 The CLCS has now made 
recommendations to Norway as to how to draw the outermost 
limits of its continental shelf.
52
 Deadlines for Canada and 
Denmark (Greenland) to make their submissions are 2013 and 
2014 respectively, and both states are desperately trying to 
collect the necessary data and information within these tight 
deadlines. According to news sources, the US has also started to 
develop its continental shelf submission, even though it is not a 
party to the UNCLOS.
53
 Already the Clinton and Bush 
Administrations have tried to become parties to the UNCLOS, 
but without result. The current Obama administration continues 
this struggle.
54
 
                                                 
49 UNCLOS, supra note 38, pt. VI art. 77(3), at 429-30. 
50 See Trude Pettersen, Russia’s Arctic Shelf Bid 90 Percent Complete, 
BARENTS OBSERVER (Dec. 13, 2011), 
http://barentsobserver.com/en/topics/russias-arctic-shelf-bid-90-percent-
complete. 
51 Norway Submission, supra note 22; see, Press Release, The Permanent 
Mission of Spain, the United Nations to the Secretary-General, Note Verbal 
(Mar. 3, 2007), available 
at  http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nor06/esp_070034
8.pdf (explaining Spain’s reaction to Norway’s submission). 
52 U.N. Comm'n of the Limits of the Cont'l Shelf, Summary of the 
Recommendations of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in 
Regard to the Submission Made by Norway in Respect of Areas in the Arctic 
Ocean, the Barents Sea and the Norwegian Sea on 27 November 2006, U.N. 
Doc CLCS/40/Rev. 1, Annex VI (Mar. 27, 2009) available at 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nor06/nor_rec_summ.
pdf (providing a summary of the recommendations made by the Commission in 
respect of Norway's submission). 
53 Defining the Limits of the U.S. Continental Shelf, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
ST., http://www.state.gov/e/oes/continentalshelf/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2013). 
54 See Sarah Ashfaq, Something for Everyone: Why the United States 
Should Rafity the Law of the Sea Treaty, 19 J. TRANSLATIONAL L. & POL. 2, 358 
(2010). See also Continental Slope Off Alaska 100 Nautical Miles Further Off 
Coast Than Assumed, SCIENCE DAILY (Feb. 12, 2008) 
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/02/080211134449.htm. 
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To articulate to the world that what they were doing was 
only to follow the law of the sea, the Arctic Ocean coastal states 
convened a preparatory meeting as early as the end of 2007 and 
organized a political level meeting in Greenland in May 2008, 
wherein they issued what is known as the Ilulissat Declaration.
55
 
In the Declaration, they made it clear that there is already a 
comprehensive legal regime in place in the Arctic, the law of the 
sea.
56
 In other words, there is no reckless vying for power over 
the Arctic Ocean seabed but an orderly development that 
proceeds on the basis of the law of the sea. Among other issues, 
coastal states stated that “the law of the sea provides for 
important rights and obligations concerning the delineation of 
the outer limits of the continental shelf” and that they “remain 
committed to this legal framework and to the orderly settlement 
of any possible overlapping claims.” States committed 
themselves also to co-operating themselves in resource intensive 
scientific work required to make a submission to the CLCS, and 
this has occurred between many Arctic Ocean coastal states.
57
   
Now, it seemed evident that it was the law of the sea that 
explained the continental shelf activity of the Arctic Ocean 
coastal states, not the storyline referred to here as “scramble for 
resources.” Not only were the coastal states only following the 
procedures set out by UNCLOS, but they also explicitly 
committed to the orderly settlement of any possible disputes over 
where their continental shelf boundary would lie. It seemed, 
indeed, that the law of the sea could explain what is happening 
as pertaining to states’ continental shelf activity. 
                                                 
55 See Illulissat Declaration, Den-Green, May 28, 2009, available at 
http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Ilulissat_Declaration.pdf. 
56 The coastal states stated that “[i]n this regard, we recall that an 
extensive international legal framework applies to the Arctic Ocean as 
discussed between our representatives at the meeting in Oslo on 15 and 16 
October 2007 at the level of senior officials. Notably, the law of the sea 
provides for important rights and obligations concerning the delineation of the 
outer limits of the continental shelf, the protection of the marine environment, 
including ice-covered areas, freedom of navigation, marine scientific research, 
and other uses of the sea. We remain committed to this legal framework and to 
the orderly settlement of any possible overlapping claims.” See id. 
57 See id. 
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III. SOMEWHAT ORDERLY EXPLOITATION 
 
After more debate and argument, difficult questions arose 
over the role of the law of the sea as the simple explanation of 
what had motivated state action in the area. Many started to 
question whether indeed the Arctic Ocean coastal states were 
only innocently following the rules of the law of the sea and 
UNCLOS.
58
 It seemed natural to assume that if states follow 
rules, they do so for their own self-interest. The question then 
arose, why do states follow these continental shelf rules? The 
reason for this can be found from the negotiations leading up to 
the conclusion of the UNCLOS.  
When the states were negotiating the rules on where the 
limits for outer continental shelf should lie, those with broad 
continental margin made sure that UNCLOS would codify such 
rules, thereby maximizing their hydrocarbon interests.
59
 The 
practical consequence of this is that Article 76, which regulates 
the maximum outer limits of continental shelf, is now so flexible 
that it is almost certain that hydrocarbons will be found within 
the states’ continental shelves.60 Hence, when the rules were 
already negotiated during the 1970’s, these hydrocarbon interests 
were secured for coastal states.
61
 But these rules are beneficial 
for states also for other reasons. By processing their submissions 
via the CLCS, states will have their broad continental shelf 
boundaries endorsed by an international body. With that process, 
which is a fairly secretive process, states will receive guidance 
                                                 
58 I presented these thoughts in our National Defence University’s 
Suomenlinna seminar, on 2 June 2010. See Timo Koivurova, Scramble for 
Resources or Orderly Development - What is Happening in the Arctic, in 
NORDIC COOPERATION AND THE FAR NORTH 1-13 (Salmela ed.), available at 
http://www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/74180/StratL2_46w.pdf?sequence=
1. 
59 Timo Koivurova, The Actions of the Arctic States Respecting the 
Continental Shelf: A Reflective Essay, 42 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 211, 215 
(2011) [hereinafter Actions of the Arctic States]. 
60 See FRIDTJOF NANSENS INSTITUTT & DNV, ARCTIC RESOURCE 
DEVELOPMENT: RISK AND RESPONSIBLE MANAGEMENT 7 (2012), available at 
http://www.dnv.com/binaries/arctic_resource_development_tcm4-532195.pdf. 
61 Actions of the Arctic States, supra note 59, at 215. 
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on how to enact their outermost limits.
62
 When they enact their 
outermost limits on the basis of these recommendations, they 
receive near universal legitimacy for their very broad continental 
shelf powers. One could turn the question around and ask: why 
would states not follow the rules that legitimized their large 
entitlements to the continental shelf and to the hydrocarbons? 
It was only after this debate was completed within the Arctic 
governance knowledge community, I argue, that we were ready 
to really penetrate what was problematic in offshore oil and gas 
exploitation. It was not really the inter-state aspects that were so 
interesting, since in any case most of the hydrocarbons would sit 
comfortably in one or another state’s jurisdiction. Instead, what 
is important is taking place within the limits of national 
jurisdiction. So, now we were finally able to focus on the 
questions regarding the most problematic aspects of Arctic 
resource exploitation: 
 
 Whether states are allowing very risky Arctic offshore 
oil and gas exploitation?
63
 
 If they are, how are Arctic communities and ecosystems 
taken into account in planning these operations, how are 
indigenous rights protected; how is worker safety 
ensured, etc.? 
 
And, we already have some tentative answers to these 
questions. It seems that the Arctic states (and also e.g. 
Greenlandic Inuit)
64
 are ready to open their hydrocarbons for 
                                                 
62 See Rules of Procedure of the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf, Comm’n on the Limits of the Cont’l Shelf, 25th Sess., Mar. 
17-April 18, 2008, annex II, CLCS/40/Rev.1 (April 17, 2008). 
63 Timo Koivurova & Kamrul Hossain, Hydrocarbon Development in the 
Offshore Arctic: Can it be Done Sustainability?, 10 OIL, GAS & ENERGY L. 
INTELLIGENCE, Jan. 2012, at 1, available at 
http://www.arcticcentre.org/loader.aspx?id=3f84034c-e386-476f-a282-
3b6ac1a035e2. 
64 See Andreas Østhagen, Dimensions of Oil and Gas Development in 
Greenland, THE ARCTIC INSTITUTE, 
http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2012/12/dimensions-of-oil-and-gas-
development.html (last visited June 09, 2013). 
2013] The Dialectic of Understanding Arctic Governance 17 
 
companies (state-owned or private), and there are significant 
interests in exploiting these on the part of the companies, even if 
there are significant risks involved in, among other things, 
drilling in ice-infested waters.
65
 On the other hand, Arctic Ocean 
coastal states’ national regulatory systems and institutions are 
mostly there to regulate and ensure that this is done in a safe and 
environmentally sound manner.
66
 Moreover, the two agreements 
that have been negotiated under the auspices of the Arctic 
Council – the search and rescue agreement and the oil spills 
agreement
67
 – both are important for preparing for the worst-case 
scenarios in Arctic offshore oil and gas development. In a similar 
vein, the Arctic Council has already revised its Offshore Oil and 
Gas Guidelines twice,
68
 which testifies to the effect that these 
Guidelines are taken seriously, even if no monitoring of how 
these Guidelines are being used in practice is taking place. Yet, 
some questions are left unanswered. How can we, for example, 
make sure that these rules are monitored and enforced in the 
Arctic’s remote conditions, with both personnel and equipment 
resources lacking? The latter may point to the importance of 
corporate social responsibility standards of companies operating 
in the Arctic, another issue-area where the Arctic Council has 
commenced action.
69
 
                                                 
65 TIMO KOIVUROVA & KARUL HOSSAIN, OFFSHORE HYDROCARBON: 
CURRENT POLICY CONTEXT IN THE MARINE ARCTIC, available at http://arctic-
transform.org/download/OffHydBP.pdf. 
66 Id. 
67 Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and 
Rescue in the Arctic, available at http://www.ifrc.org/docs/idrl/N813EN.pdf 
(last visited June 12, 2013); Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil 
Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic, available at 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/05/209406.htm (last visited June 09, 
2013); See also Timo Koivurova, New Ways to Respond to Climate Change in 
the Arctic, 16 ASIL INSIGHTS 33 (2012), available at 
http://www.asil.org/pdfs/insights/insight121023.pdf (last visited June 09, 
2013). 
68 The first Guidelines were published in 1997, the first revision was done 
in 2002 and the latest revision was in 2009. Arctic Council, Arctic Offshore Oil 
and Gas Guidelines, 2009, http://library.arcticportal.org/ 
1551/1/offshore_oil_and_gas_guidlines.pdf (last visited June 09, 2013). 
69 See DEPARTMENT FOR INFRASTRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION, 
GUIDELINES FOR SIDA’S SUPPORT TO CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, 
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IV. DIALECTICS OF HOW OUR UNDERSTANDING HAS 
PROGRESSED 
 
It is tempting to explain the way our knowledge 
community’s collective understanding progressed with the resort 
to the dialectical theory of understanding. There are various sub-
branches in the general theory of dialectics, but a popular version 
of dialectics proceeds from the idea that there is first a thesis, 
which is necessarily countered by an antithesis, trying to fully 
challenge the original thesis, and this challenge leading to 
synthesis.
70
 One of the fathers of dialectics, Georg Friedrich 
Wilhelm Hegel (1770-1831), did not use these exact terms, but 
instead preferred the progression from abstract to negative 
leading into the concrete, which better captures the progression 
in how the Arctic governance knowledge community evolved in 
its understanding. According to Hegel, the original thesis is 
necessarily abstract since it is yet to be tested in practice.
71
 It is 
this trial and error that leads to the antithesis, the negative, which 
then leads to the concrete, the synthesis.
72
 
If we examine the progress in the evolution in our 
interpretation, it seems clear that the scramble for resources was 
a typical abstract thesis, which made sense in many ways. Yet, 
when serious efforts commenced to examine whether this 
storyline indeed matched reality, the knowledge community 
found that it did not; it was proved to be negative. States’ 
actions, and words demonstrated that states were following law 
of the sea and UNCLOS very closely. Hence, it was nearly 
                                                                                                 
(2005), available at http://www.sida.se/Global/Partners/N%C3%A4ringsliv/ 
CSR-gudielines%20%282%29.pdf (accessed June 09, 2013). 
70 See generally Michael H.G. Hoffmann, The Curse of the Hegelian 
Heritage: “Dialectic,” “Contradiction,” and “Dialectical Logic” in Activity 
Theory, IVAN ALLEN COLLEGE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY, Working Paper 
Series No. 9, 2005 available at 
http://www.spp.gatech.edu/faculty/workingpapers/wp9.pdf (last visited June 
2013). 
71 Nathan Rotenstreich, Some Remarks on the Formal Structure of 
Hegel's Dialectic, 5 PHIL. AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. no. 2, 242-46 (1944). 
72 Id. at 246-52. 
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impossible to continue holding the idea that there was some kind 
of lawless scramble over who gets to occupy most of the state 
floor when everything showed that states were behaving on the 
basis of the law of the sea and UNCLOS. Thus, the thesis was 
clearly negated. Yet, this is not the whole story. This negation 
enabled researchers to delve further into why states were 
following the law of the sea and UNCLOS, and to rejecting the 
idea that this was a situation where states were acting merely to 
follow the rules, given the beneficial nature those rules had on 
the interests of coastal states. This then lead to more concrete 
questions over what exactly is problematic as regards Arctic 
offshore oil and gas exploitation and enhanced our ability to 
focus on specific questions that could be answered in a more 
nuanced manner.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
As I have argued, we have clearly witnessed a progress in 
our knowledge community’s understanding through rational 
discussion based on scientific principles, in particular that all 
arguments and theories can be falsified. Scientific principles 
lead, necessarily, into challenging all truth-claims and, thereby, 
there is an inherent self-correction at work. At the very least, this 
functioned in the case studied in this article.  
Unfortunately, we have not had the same development in the 
media, which keeps repeating the same scramble for resources 
story line. There are probably many reasons for this, including 
commercial ones, but it seems that there are also underlying 
reasons why the general audience wants to hear of the great 
game in the Arctic. It seems obvious that the Wild West allegory 
has a strong resonance when we talk of Arctic matters. Given the 
enormous influence the Wild West has had on Western culture, 
especially via the popular culture, it is no wonder that people 
tend to find similarities when they compare the Wild West and 
the current “final frontier” - the Arctic. The Wild West was seen 
as a new frontier, just like the current Arctic, with presence of 
indigenous populations and new economic possibilities. It was 
also a place for those who were brave enough to penetrate into 
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this new world, with no laws and no sheriffs, very much the way 
the Arctic has been described in the media.
73
 
It is also the case that the general public does not have the 
same interest for knowledge as the members of the Arctic 
governance knowledge community. Most in the general public 
do not possess a special relationship to the region; very few have 
even visited it. It is more of a place for imagination and hearing 
interesting stories, especially because they do not possess the 
normative relationship to the region. They do not care about 
what happens to the region and its inhabitants. This also explains 
why the Arctic governance knowledge community has quickly 
revised its interpretations as to what happens in the region, in 
addition to the fact that this is where they possess special 
expertise and are expected to provide knowledge that correlates 
with what is actually taken place in the region. 
Overall, we have witnessed clear progress in the way the 
Arctic governance knowledge community now understands the 
matters Arctic, but even this progress is clouded by the 
projections of how quickly climate change is progressing, in 
general, and particularly in the Arctic. It seems particularly 
relevant to point out – as Greenpeace has now done in its 
campaign
74
 – that states are opening the final hydrocarbon 
province, which is at the same time seen as the early warning 
place of global climate change.
75
 Our rational debate on the 
twists and turns of the direction of Arctic governance seems to 
pale in comparison with the threats posed by climate change to 
the region. Even if the Arctic does play a very strong symbolic 
                                                 
73 See, Franklyn Griffiths, Towards a Canadian Arctic Strategy, FOREIGN 
POLICY FOR CANADA’S TOMORROW 1 (2009), http://opencanada.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/05/Towards-a-Canadian-Arctic-Strategy-Franklyn-
Griffiths1.pdf (accessed June 09, 2013). According to Griffiths, “Over the next 
while, climate change and media hype on the ‘cold rush’ for Arctic seabed 
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the world.” Id. 
74 Because of its concerns on the uninhabited area of the Arctic high 
north, Greenpeace’s campaign is to put a ban on oil drilling in the area in order 
to save the Arctic. See THE GREENPEACE CAMPAIGN (2012), 
http://www.savethearctic.org/ (last visited June 11, 2013). 
75 IMPACTS, supra note 18, at 24. 
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region in our fight against climate change, all evidence points to 
the direction that if only possible, oil and gas resources of the 
region will be exploited.
76
 This is not a good sign for how we as 
humanity can face up to our probably biggest long-term 
challenge, climate change. 
 
                                                 
76 See Timo Koivurova, Environmental Protection in the Arctic and 
Antarctica, in POLAR LAW TEXTBOOK 23, 42 (Natalia Loukecheva ed., 2010). 
